Journal of Dispute Resolution
Volume 1995

Issue 2

Article 4

1995

Mandatory Arbitration and Title VII: Can Employees Ever See Their
Rights Vindicated through Statutory Causes of Action - Metz v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & (and) Smith
Penelope Hopper

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons

Recommended Citation
Penelope Hopper, Mandatory Arbitration and Title VII: Can Employees Ever See Their Rights Vindicated
through Statutory Causes of Action - Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & (and) Smith, 1995 J. Disp.
Resol. (1995)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1995/iss2/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Dispute Resolution by an authorized editor
of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Hopper: Hopper: Mandatory Arbitration and Title VII:

NOTES
Mandatory Arbitration And Title
VII: Can Employees Ever See Their

Rights Vindicated Through
Statutory Causes of Action?
Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith'

I. INTRODUCTION
Through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title VII and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, Congress has granted American employees an increased number
of potential statutory causes of action. At the same time, litigation has decreased.
with a rise in the popularity of alternative dispute resolution.' Thus, it is no
surprise that many modem employment contracts require employees to stipulate
a dispute resolution forum through which any future legal conflict may be
resolved, usually at the bequest of the prospective employer. The legal trend is
to enforce mandatory arbitration and mediation clauses when a statutory cause of
action is at issue or the employer has full say over the terms of the "voluntary"
contractual agreement. Can employer-mandated arbitration truly protect the rights
of minority employees and applicants as intended by the drafters of Title VII?
This Note examines that question by evaluating how the Tenth Circuit interpreted
the most recent United States Supreme Court findings on the issue.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Kelli Lyn Metz worked for Merrill Lynch in its Oklahoma City office for
approximately five years before she was fired in September 1988.' Metz
informed Merrill Lynch's management that she was pregnant about one month

1. 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994).
2. Susan P. Adams et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment DiscriminationClaims,
54 LA. L. REv. 1533, 1535 (1994).
3. Met-, 39 F.3d at 1485. After graduation from the University of Oklahoma, Metz was hired
by Merrill Lynch as a sales assistant. She was promoted about nine months later to the position of
account executive, otherwise known as a stock broker. Her production was recognized as sufficient
in 1985 and 1986, even though it was generally lower than that of other brokers with similar
experience. Yet, in 1987 and 1988, she was placed on probation for poor production. id.
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prior to being fired.' When company officials learned of her pregnancy, they told
her that workers taking maternity leave typically did not keep up with production
schedules upon their return to the company or did not return at all.' Although
other company employees on leave were allowed to decide how their accounts
would be handled when they took leave, Metz's supervisor informed her that he
would decide how her accounts were distributed among other employees during
her maternity leave.'
In September 1989, Metz filed a complaint in district court asserting Title
VII, ERISA, and state common law claims against Merrill Lynch.' Merrill Lynch
responded by filing a motion to stay the district court proceedings and a motion
The mandatory arbitration claim was based on the
to compel arbitration.'
application Metz signed when she became a broker with the company.9 In
addition, her registration with the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD") included a clause mandating arbitration of any claims or disputes
between Metz and Merrill Lynch.' °
The district court sided with Merrill Lynch on the mandatory arbitration of
the ERISA and common law claims, but declined to force the Title VII claim into
arbitration." The Tenth Circuit found that arbitration was an inappropriate
forum to decide the issue of rights created by Title VII and denied Merrill Lynch's
motion for reconsideration. 2
Merrill Lynch filed an interlocutory appeal to the district court's order
denying arbitration in March 199 0 . The company withdrew the appeal several
months later because numerous circuits had found that Title VII claims were not
arbitrable.'" The Tenth Circuit quickly entered an order dismissing the appeal.' 5
Following a bench trial, the district court awarded Metz a $53,746.67
judgment on her Title VII claim in July 1991.16 Merrill Lynch made a motion
to appeal the judgment which was denied by the district court.' 7 In May 1991,
one month prior to the bench trial on Metz's Title VII claim resulting in the July
ruling in her favor, the United States Supreme Court handed down two major
rulings directly affecting cases dealing with the issues of arbitration and Title VII

4.

Id.

5. Id. Metz's firing followed a heated discussion with her immediate supervisor regarding a
problem with one of her accounts. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.at 1486.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.

14.

Id.

15. Id.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
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claims.18 Merrill Lynch appealed the district court's rejection of the lower
court's decision in Metz's favor on the Title VII claim, arguing that the applicable
case law changed and that Title VII claims could now be subject to compulsory
arbitration.' 9
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Circuit Judge Holloway
held that Title VII claims, like age discrimination claims, are subject to mandatory
arbitration agreements.2" The court, however, went on to find that Merrill Lynch
2
had actually waived its right to compel arbitration on the facts of this case. In
holding that compulsory arbitration extended to Title VII discrimination claims,
the Tenth Circuit declared that the "aims and substantive prohibitions" of both
Title VII and the Age Discrimination and Employment Act ("ADEA") were
similar.22 Therefore, having previously held compulsory arbitration proper in
ADEA cases, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that mandatory arbitration also properly
applied to Title VII claims.23

18. Id. at 1490. In May 1991, the United States Supreme Court held in Gilmer v. Interstate
Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), that age discrimination claims could be subject to mandatory
arbitration agreements. One week later, the Court vacated and remanded the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990); see 500 U.S. 930 (1991) (the
United States Supreme Court's remand of Alford). The Fifth Circuit expressly held there was no right
to compel arbitration in Title VII cases; the United States Supreme Court clearly came to the opposite
conclusion regarding the same issue. Id.
19. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1485. Metz cross-appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing
that even if Title VII claims can be subject to mandatory arbitration clauses, those clauses must be
included in the employment contract between the company trying to mandate arbitration between itself
and the fired employee. Metz argued that the clause in question was written in her registration form
to become a licensed broker, not in her employment contract. While Metz's argument cites a major
issue in this case and others affecting the statutory and contractual rights of employees filing Title VII
claims, it is not central to the topic of this Note and will not be addressed in detail. Id. at 1486.
20. Id. at 1487.
21. Id. at 1490.
22. Id. at 1487.
23. Id. (citing Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988)). In the
Cooper case, the Tenth Circuit applied the rule denying the preclusive effect of an arbitration hearing
award in Title VII cases to ADEA cases. The Tenth Circuit now uses the analogy to extend mandatory
arbitration to both types of claims. Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1553-54.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
From 1974 to 1990, the United States Supreme Court's stance on the
arbitration of Title VII discrimination cases by private claimants was set out in the
case of Alexander v.Gardner-Denver Co.24 The Alexander court held that
Congress intended for the federal courts to have final responsibility for enforcing
Title VII claims and that deferral to arbitration would be inconsistent with those
goals.25 The Court further noted that "there can be no prospective waiver of an
employee's rights under Title VII. ' 2 6 In deference to the applicability of the
Alexander opinion to employment issues, the Eighth Circuit has held that the
Court's reasoning turned on "the unique nature of Title VII." 7
In the past decade, other decisions have mitigated the harshness of the United
s
States Supreme Court's anti-arbitration stance as expressed in Alexander." The
Court openly weakened its stance on the non-arbitrability of statutory claims by
recognizing a presumption of arbitrability for commercial contracts arising under
the Sherman Act in 1985.29 While holding that the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA") allowed some statutory claims to be the subject of prior arbitration
agreements, the Court noted that not all statutory claims may be properly subjected
to such agreements.3
The Court continued a trend of accepting the arbitration of statutory claims
two years later in Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v. McMahon.3 1 The Shearson
court held that Congress did not intend to preclude the option of waiving the right

to a judicial forum (in favor of arbitration) for resolution of a statutory right

24. Heidi M. Hellekson, Taking the "Alternative" out of the Dispute Resolution of Title VII
Claims: The Implicationsof a MandatoryEnforcement Scheme ofArbitrationAgreements Arising out
of Employment Contracts, 70 N.D. L. REv. 435, 438 (1994). Hellekson notes that "as late as 1990,
the federal circuit courts relied on Alexander as authority for allowing those who would had signed
compulsory arbitration agreements to pursue their claims in court." See generally Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
25. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56.
26. Id.at 51.
27. Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1306 (8th Cir. 1988). The
Alexander court itself noted that employees exercising their right to a judicial forum in Title VII cases
were not only redressing their own injuries, but were also vindicating "the important congressional
policy against discriminatory employment practices." Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45.
28. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) (noting that any intent to expressly prevent arbitration of Title VII claims would have been
apparent in the language or legislative history of the act); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (noting a strong endorsement of the federal
statutes favoring arbitration as a method of resolving disputes).
29. See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614.
30. Id. at 627.
31. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). In McMahon, the United States Supreme Court enforced an arbitration
agreement for a claim arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and those arising under the
Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO").
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absent an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying
purposes.32
The United States Supreme Court took a further step away from Alexander
in Rodriguez de Quijas, holding that an agreement made pursuant to the Securities
Act of 1933 could be arbitrated despite a non-waiver provision in the act.3" The
Rodriguez de Quijas Court also found that unequal bargaining power between
employees and employers did not make agreements per se unenforceable in the
employment context.34
The Court consistently recognized the significance of the FAA in the context
of mandatory arbitration of statutory claims in opinions throughout the 1980's.
For instance, the United States Supreme Court, in Perry v. Thomas,35 referred to
the FAA as the embodiment of congressional intent to provide for the enforcement
of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause.36 In
Southland Corp. v. Keating,37 the United States Supreme Court held that "in
enacting § 2 of the FAA, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration
and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution
3
of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. 1
Neither the Perry nor Southland decision drew unanimous approval from the
Court.39 In his Perry dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the FAA is over fifty
years old, yet it was "only in the last few years that the Court has effectively
rewritten the statute to give it a preemptive scope that Congress certainly did not
Justice O'Connor, also dissenting in Perry, complained that the
intend."4
majority's interpretation of the FAA was "unfaithful to congressional intent,
unnecessary, and in light of the [Act's] antecedents and the intervening contraction

32. Id. at 225-27.
33.
34.

See generally Rodriguez de Quyas, 490 U.S. 477.
Rodriguez de Quias,490 U.S. at 483-84. The Court stated that there was no factual showing

below that the agreement to arbitrate "was adhesive in nature." Id. at 484.
35. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
36. Perry, 482 U.S. at 490; see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1 (1983). In Mercury Constr., the Court held that Section 2 of the FAA represents a
congressional declaration of the federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. Id.

37. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
38. Id. at 10. Section 2 of the FAA reads:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing
to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or
refusal, shall be valid, enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
39. Justices Stevens and O'Connor each dissented from both decisions. Southland, 465 U.S. at
17-36 (O'Connor, J., & Stevens, J., dissenting); Perry, 482 U.S. at 493-95 (O'Connor, J., & Stevens,
J., dissenting).
dissenting).
40. Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 (Stevens, J.,

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

5

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1995, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 4
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 1995, No. 2

of federal power, inexplicable.'"'
Justice O'Connor further argued that if
Congress has the power to expressly limit the scope of the FAA mandate over
statutory causes of action, state lawmakers ought to be able to limit the use of
mandatory arbitration in regard to defining the contractual rights and obligations
of state citizens as well.42 The majority of the Court, however, maintained that
the FAA mandates the enforcement of contractual arbitration agreements between
contracting parties, absent a few exceptions. 3
Meanwhile, through the late eighties and early nineties, the expansion of
statutory rights and remedies accorded to employees in discrimination disputes
continued to grow.44 A resulting "litigation explosion" followed along with
corresponding acceptance of the widespread use of alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") methods. 5 These changes solidified the general judicial trend toward
recognizing contractual agreements to arbitrate workplace conflicts.46
The trend was marked most significantly by the United States Supreme Court
in the majority's opinion in the 1991 case of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lake
Corp.4" In Gilmer, the Court held that an employer could compel a fired
employee to arbitrate his claim filed under the ADEA pursuant to a contractual
agreement to do so.4" The Court also distinguished Gilmer from its decision in
Gardner-Denver by differentiating the collective bargaining agreement at issue in
the earlier case from the contract at issue in Gilmer.49
The Gilmer majority cited Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., stating "[w]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the
desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited
alternative means of dispute resolution."5 The majority rejected the employee's
argument that the possibility of a biased panel, less rigorous discovery and limited
available remedies all worked against the proper vindication of his rights under the
ADEA when a dispute was arbitrated.5 The dissent in Gilmer argued that the
FAA specifically exempted private employment agreement from the scope of its

41. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing her own dissent in Southland, 465 U.S. at 36).
42. Perry, 482 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
43. Id. at 489. The exceptions according to the majority interpretation being "such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract," citing the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
44. Adams et al.,
supra note 2, at 1535. This article notes in particular the passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The latter amended Title VII to
authorize jury trials and compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
45. Id. at 1535-36.
46. Id. at 1536.
47. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
48. Id.
49. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-35.
50. Id. at34 n.5 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626-27).
5I. Id. at 30-32. The plaintiff also argued that the unequal bargaining power between employees
and employers at the time of contract and the lack of public knowledge of claims and awards, were
problematic aspects of vindicating ADEA rights through mandatory arbitration agreements. Id. at 31,
33.
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requirements compelling the enforcement of arbitration clauses. 2 Before Metz,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had not made a clear statement on the
applicability of the Gilmer decision to cases involving mandatory arbitration.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Metz, the Tenth Circuit applied its own past reasoning and that of the
United States Supreme Court to resolve the issue of mandatory arbitration and the
vindication of Title VII rights.53 The court acknowledged that a change in the
law had occurred since Metz initiated her action and that the change was marked
by the Court's May 1991 decision in Gilmer.54 In the instant case, the Tenth
Circuit held that the Court "explicitly eschewed its prior 'mistrust of the arbitral
process,' emphasizing instead the 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements' reflected in the Federal Arbitration Act. . .. ""
The Tenth Circuit coupled the decision in Gilmer with the remand of the
Fifth Circuit case of Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.56 one week later to
support its conclusion that Metz's Title VII claim was subject to compulsory
arbitration.57 The Metz court agreed with the Fifth Circuit's revised opinion in
Alford, which found a sexual discrimination and harassment case filed pursuant to
Title VII was subject to mandatory arbitration. 8 The Metz court inferred from
the Court's remand of Alford that future United States Supreme Court decisions
would generally subject Title VII claims to mandatory arbitration.5 9
In Metz, the Tenth Circuit also referenced its own likening of the policy
concerns prompting the enactment of the ADEA to those which brought about
Title VII under Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. 60 in 1988.61 The court
reasoned that since the statutes have similar goals and "substantive prohibitions"
62
the arbitration issues facing the two acts should be evaluated similarly.
The Tenth Circuit distinguished the earlier importance of Alexander, since
that case concerned an arbitration agreement in the context of a collectively
bargained contract.63 The United States Supreme Court in Gilmer distinguished

52.
53.
1994).
54.
a change
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

& Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 36 (Stevens, J.,
See generally, Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir.
Metz, 39 F.3d at 1490 ("The Supreme Court's actions in Gilmer and Alford clearly signaled
in the law governing the arbitrability of Title VII claims....
Id.
939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
Metz, 39 F.3d at 1487.
Id.
Id.
836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988).
Met, 39 F.3d at 1487.
Id.
Id.
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Alexander in the same manner." Further deferring to the Gilmer opinion, the
Tenth Circuit agreed with the majority's finding that Gilmer was subject to the
FAA, while Alexander was not.6" The Metz court also deferred to the Gilmer
logic that the Alexander view of arbitration as "inferior to the judicial process for
resolving statutory claims" has been "undermined" by subsequent Court
opinions. 6
Thus, the Tenth Circuit position on the arbitrability of Title VII cases was
driven primarily by the United States Supreme Court majority in Gilmer. Based
on its interpretation of that leading case, the Metz court held that Title VII claims
in the Tenth Circuit, like age discrimination claims, are subject to mandatory
arbitration agreements."
V. COMMENT
The Metz case marks a solid Tenth Circuit affirmation of the United States
Supreme Court majority opinion in Gilmer that mandatory arbitration can be the
first and final forum for Title VII disputes. In its agreement with that opinion, the
Tenth Circuit neglected to examine the merits of the minority position in Gilmer,
as well as the possibility that Title VII exists uniquely and independently of the
ADEA and other statutory relief mechanisms in both its purpose and
construction.6"
The court correctly emphasized the modem acceptance of the arbitration
forum and its increased popularity, but virtually ignored several other issues which
have a direct bearing on Metz's constitutional and Title VII proscribed rights. For
instance, the court brushed aside the issue of whether a brokerage application
containing the mandatory arbitration clause may be a contract of adhesion because
employees of brokerage houses have little choice whether or not to sign on as a
broker.69
Like Metz, the plaintiffs in Gilmer tried unsuccessfully to argue that the
securities dealer registration form, which contained the arbitration clause, was a
condition of employment and was unenforceable as a contract of adhesion.7"
Since the contract was signed voluntarily, the majority found that adhesion was

64. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
65. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1487 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35).
66. Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 n.5).
67. Id. at 1487-88. The Tenth Circuit held generally that mandatory arbitration agreements
pursuant to Title VII claims are enforceable. On the facts of this case, however, the court refused to
mandate arbitration of the Title VII claim at issue, because it held that Merrill Lynch had waived its
opportunity to compel arbitration by going forward with the litigation of the case via the June 1991
bench trial. id. at 1490.
68. See generally Metz, 39 F.3d at 1482.
69. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 39.
70. Maureen McClain, California MCLE Marathon 1994: Employment Law Update, in
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 1994, at 135 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
No. H4-5189 1994).
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a non-issue, while the Gilmer minority found the issue was an important one.7
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that the FAA was specifically
designed to prevent contractual agreements which force arbitration by employers
The
of employee's grievances and preclude subsequent statutory action.
dissenters cited the 1923 Senate Committee notes for the legislative history of the
FAA.73 In these notes, Senator Walsh said:
The trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that
are entered into are not [voluntary] things at all. . . .A man says,
"These are our terms. All right, take it or leave it." Well, there is
nothing for the man to do except sign it; and then he surrenders his
right to have a case by court ... "
Commentators since the Gilmer decision have also questioned the level of
autonomy potential employees have when entering into contracts with their
employers. One author has argued that "those with greater bargaining power will
take advantage of those with little or no bargaining power. Unfortunately, most
employees who are offered arbitration agreements have no bargaining power."7"
Commentators have also questioned the appropriateness of arbitration as a
forum for discrimination issues in the work place. Since arbitration is a binding,
private process, employers found guilty of discrimination will not be named to the
public as they would be following a court procedure.76 The trial-like process,
with fewer rules, may exacerbate the adversarial aspects of the parties'
relationship.77 The more procedural rules and safeguards exercised by the courts,
such as discovery requirements or hearing all available witnesses, the higher the
costs for the parties." s In addition, since arbitration rulings are limited to the
issues at hand, the same employers may be willing to continue in a cycle of
discrimination.79
Gilmer did not address exact standards for deciding whether an agreement to
arbitrate is entered into knowingly and voluntarily." Given an opportunity to

71. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 39.
72. Id. at 40. The FAA section applicable to the above issue is found in Section 1: "[Nlothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The section
indicates the available exclusions to the general rule stated in the statute that contractual agreements
to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" unless equity requires a different result. 9
U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
73. Id. at 39.
74. Id.
75. Hellekson, supra note 23, at 452.
76. Adams et al., supra note 2, at 1539.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1540.
80. Id. at 1547.
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elaborate or comment on the United States Supreme Court's failure to address
certain standards for voluntary agreement, the Tenth Circuit neglected to do so. 8
Perhaps, the Tenth Circuit felt the need to address these standards was moot, due
to the United States Supreme Court's vacation and remand of the Alford case and
given the fact that a waiver of the arbitration option was found. Instead of
questioning the issue of voluntary agreement, the Metz court quickly agreed with
the Gilmer majority, brushing aside any debate on the issue despite the split of
lower courts on the meaning of the FAA's ambiguous language. 2 The Gilmer
court also decided to "leave for another day" the decision of whether the FAA
exclusion clause would apply to all employment contracts. 3
One thing that the FAA is clear about, and which the Metz and Gilmer
decisions seem to disregard, is the extremely limited review accorded
commercially arbitrated decisions.84 Under the FAA, courts may only vacate an
award in situations involving fraud, misconduct or corruption on the part of the
arbitrator.85 Courts can modify such awards only in the case of "manifest
disregard" for the law. 6 Thus, the FAA prevents a prospective plaintiff from
bringing suit if the award were based on a misinterpretation of Title VII law by
the arbitrator. As one commentator wrote, "it is most certain that the FAA's
system of review will not allow these claimants adequate review of their arbitral
awards." 7
In its blanket endorsement of Gilmer, the Metz court also fails to recognize
that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case that the Gilmer decision arose out
of was an anomaly among the circuits.88 The trend among the other circuits was
to allow discrimination claims into the federal court system, despite previously
signed arbitration agreements. 89
The Metz ruling creates a rule in the Tenth Circuit that arbitration clauses in
employees' contracts with their employers will be enforced even when the
employee's claim involves essential statutory rights contained in Title VII, even
when the contract was not voluntary. This rule ignores the fact that keeping
employees' discrimination claims in the judicial forum would assure public

81. See generally Metz, 39 F.3d 1482.
82. Adams et al., supra note 2, at 1546. Some courts have narrowly construed the language of
FAA Section I to apply only to employees in the interstate commerce business of moving goods.
Others have read the clause broadly like the dissent in Gilmer. "No doubt Congress or the Supreme
Court will revisit this issue since no sound rationale is apparent for varying the rules on the arbitration
of civil rights claims depending on the industry in which the plaintiff works." Id.
83. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. The issue of the FAA exclusion for "contracts of employment"
was not brought out by the plaintiff in Gilmer, which is one of the reasons the Court gives for not
deciding this issue.
84. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1988) (explaining the standards for a vacation or modification of an
arbitral award).
85. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988).
86. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1988).
87. Hellekson, supra note 23, at 441.
88. Id. at 440.
89. Id.
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accountability for guilty employers and would prevent stagnation of employment
discrimination law.9" Beyond ignoring consistent application of the law, the
court quickly extinguishes a party's right to the protections of a trial. Employees
should voluntarily relinquish the judicial forum, with its mandatory due process
and discovery requirements, in order for arbitration to legitimately be considered
a fair "alternative. ' 91
The Tenth Circuit virtually discounted the possibility that Metz's registration
contract could have been one of adhesion and deferred to Gilmer to find such
contracts generally enforceable.92 By focusing instead on whether the employer
in this case had actually waived its right to demand arbitration, the Metz court not
only ignored the possibility that the "agreement" to arbitrate was involuntary, but
presumed that such an agreement could adequately assure the rights guaranteed by
Title VII.
The Gilmer decision left many questions unanswered concerning the
arbitration of employee/employer conflicts. The Metz court had the opportunity
to clarify some of those issues for future application in the Tenth Circuit. Instead,
the court skirted the question by calling the right to mandate arbitration a given
and shifting the focus to the question whether Merrill Lynch waived its right to
arbitration. Metz could forbode a post-Gilmer trend of creating contracts in which
employees sign away their rights of judicial enforcement of Title VII guarantees,
the very laws designed to help level the skewed work-place playing field.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note is not to suggest that alternative dispute resolution can never
properly vindicate a claimant's rights given statutory causes of action. Indeed, it
has been argued that the cost, efficiency and accessibility of arbitration in
comparison to litigation means that more people with legitimate complaints are
able to have their grievances heard and resolved.93 But, the issue of whether an
agreement to arbitrate is truly voluntary or whether the discovery and evidentiary
requirements of the arbitration forum adequately enforce a claimant's Title VII
rights are too important to be taken out of the judicial setting.
The Gilmer court's enforcement of mandatory arbitration purported to be an
endorsement of arbitration's merits, finding the alternative forum capable of
vindicating the rights of a statutory claimant. The Metz court's endorsement of
the same view came without justification, yet extended the logic to subject Title
VII claims to mandatory arbitration. The Gilmer court attempted to leave the
issue of unequal bargaining power for lower courts to decide. However, applying

90. Id.at 451.
91. Id.at 457.
92. Metz, 39 F.3d at 1488.
93. Adams et al., supra note 2, at 1558. The writers note that "[t]he reality is that a more
informal, simpler and less confrontational system like ADR will encourage more valid complaints of
discrimination to come forward. For many individuals, ADR expands access to the legal system." Id.
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the Metz court's extension of that decision, there is nothing left for the lower
courts to decide. At least in the context of securities registration application, the
only thing a Tenth Circuit claimant needs to do to forfeit the judicial forum, and
get hired, is sign on the dotted line.94
PENELOPE HOPPER

94. Ms. Metz signed as a registered broker with the National Association of Securities Dealers.
Presumably, as a stock broker for Merrill Lynch, such registration was required for her to continue her
employment there. This is the contract which contained the mandatory arbitration clause at issue in
the case.
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